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tion can be made without qualification: Those who advocate containing
the law of title duplication within its present boundaries are running
counter to the stream of history. As the court stated in the Johnston
case :104
Property rights exist because they promote the general welfare. As society has developed there has been a corresponding
evolution in the development of property rights. Matters considered as near revolutionary a few short years ago. are now
accepted as facts. Legal history shows a continual recognition
of new interests and a gradual willingness to protect interests
in intangible things.
When the market place says that entertainment titles have monetary value
and must be effectively protected, can the courts be far behind?

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The general public, legal writers and the courts long have recognized
the inequities of the law in its treatment of the indigent criminal defendant. For many years legal assistance has been provided to the indigent in some areas of the United States through private legal aid societies, yet this activity has been restricted almost entirely to civil litigation.1 In those few areas where there has been private legal assistance
for the indigent criminal defendant, a lack of funds and the sheer volume
of cases has limited the scope of these programs.' For these reasons the
burden of protecting the indigent in a criminal prosecution has been upon
the courts.
In early decisions little consideration was given to the plight of the
indigent although prosecuted under a judicial system which relies heavily
upon the adversary system to protect individual rights. After 1900,
however, increasing recognition was given to the importance of counsel
104. Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187 P.2d

474, 487 (Dist. Ct App. 1947).
1. "[0] f the 200 legal aid offices in existence by mid-1958, only six handle criminal
cases." SPECIAL COMIMx. TO STUDY DEFENDER SYSTEm, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF N.Y., EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED, 42-44 (1959).
2. Id. at 69, 71-72.
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for those defendants unable to provide for their own defense,3 and in
1932 the Supreme Court of the United States in Powell v. Alabama4
recognized in unequivocal terms the necessity of counsel in criminal
proceedings:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how
to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence,
how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those
of feeble intellect.'
Under the Powell ruling something more than merely providing counsel
at the time the defendant pleads or the issue goes to trial was envisioned.
3. It has been claimed that this significant change in attitude was a reflection of
the changing values and standards of American society. Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment,45 MiNN. L. REv. 771-72 (1961).
4. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5. Id. at 68, 69. This case involved the application of the fourteenth amendment in
a state prosecution for a capital offense. In its holding the court pointed out that "all
that it is necessary to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own
defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of
due process of law." Id. at 71. The broader question on whether this same doctrine
would apply in other criminal prosecutions was specifically left open. Ten years later
in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (a non-capital state prosecution for robbery),
Powell was distinguished and limited only to serious offenses where a denial of counsel
would be "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right. .. ."
Id. at 473. In 1963, however, the Supreme Court rejected this narrow interpretation and
held the Powell doctrine was not limited to capital offenses. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963). The Court declared: "A defendant's need for a lawyer is nowhere
better stated than in the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama. . . ." Gideon v. W1ainwright, supra at 344. Such a return to the broad protective language of Powell had been strongly advocated in concurring opinions in Cornley
v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 517-20 (1962) and McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 117-19
(1961). The actual case involved a felony, but the Court referred to the sixth amendment which covers misdemeanors as well.
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That seemed clear from the adoption by the Court of the language of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. O'Keefe: "It is vain
to give the accused a day in court, with no opportunity to prepare for it,
or to guarantee him counsel without giving the latter any opportunity to
acquaint himself with the facts or law of the case. '
Since the Powell decision courts have, both by judicial decision and
rule of court, continued to expand across the entire spectrum of federal
and state criminal proceedings an indigent's right to appointment of
counsel.' But even so there now exists a significant disparity in the time
at which an indigent defendant may consult with assigned counsel, and
when the defendant with means can enlist retained counsel. This disparity has resulted not only in a systematic de facto denial to the indigent
of many important pretrial rights and immunities, but has also necessarily limited the effectiveness of his counsel once assigned. In December, 1962, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules submitted to the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States a draft of proposed amendments to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendments proposed to Rules 5
and 44 were clearly intended to remedy this disparity as to the time at
which the federal criminal defendant may consult with counsel.' This
6.

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932)

citing Commonwealth v. O'Keefe,

298 Pa. 169, 173, 148 Atl. 73, 74 (1929).
7. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938) ; FED. R. CRIM. P. 44. State law and practices vary widely but there has been a
similar expansion of the protection afforded indigents by the state courts. For a complete summary of the right to counsel under state laws see, BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS, ch. 4 (1955) ; Feliman, The Right to Counsel Under
State Law, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 281.
8. CoMMf
i. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AIaENDMENTS, RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, (Dec. 1962) [hereinafter
cited as PRELIMINARY DRAFT]. See 31 F.R.D. 665 (1963). The proposed amendments to
Rules 5 and 44 are (new material in italics) : Rule 5. Proceedings Before the Commissioner.
(b)
Statement by the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall inform the
defendant of the complaint against him, of his right to retain counsel, of hlis

right to request the assignment of counsel, and of his right to have a preliminary
examination. He shall also inform the defendant that he is not required to make
a statement and that any statement made by him may be used against him. The
Commissioner shall allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules.
Rule 44. Right to and Assignment of Counsel
(a) Right to Assigned Counsel. Every defendant who is unable to obtain
counsel shall be entitled, if he so requests, to have counsel assigned to represent
hin within a reasonable time after such request.
(b) Assignment Procedure. District courts shall establish by rule appropriate local procedures to implement the right established in subdivision (a).
These procedures may include provision for assignment of counsel by Conmnissioners or by any other reasonable miethod and need not require the personal
presence of the defendant itcourt at the tine of the assignment.
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note will seek to determine the cause of the disparity as to when the rights
of assigned and retained counsel accrue to the federal defendant, whether
the temporal disparity so produced has created significant inequities in the
treatment accorded the indigent defendant which should be remedied, and
will analyze the nature and anticipated effectiveness of the proposed
amendments to the federal rules.

I. THE

RIGHT OF ASSIGNED AND RETAINED COUNSEL IN A FEDERAL
CRI-MINAL PROCEEDING

Right to Counsel and the Constitution. Until 1938 the right to counsel in the federal courts under the sixth amendment was generally considered to be limited to the right to be represented by retained counsel.'
Even so, many federal courts appointed counsel for indigent defendants
prior to this time,"0 and it was the 1938 case of Johiison v. Zerbst1' that
finally squared substance with practice for it extended the protection of
the sixth amendment to all federal criminal defendants by requiring assigmnent of counsel for indigents at the time of trial. The right of assigned counsel at the time of trial is now guaranteed to all indigent federal criminal defendants.1 w
(c) Appearance in Court. If the defendant appears in court without
counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel
to represent him at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed
without counsel or is able to obtain counsel.
9. The Supreme Court has considered no case in which this issue was directly
raised. However, Congress shortly after proposing the first ten amendments to the Constitution in September, 1789, passed an act, 1 Stat. 118 (1790), requiring assignment of
counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases (18 U.S.C. 3005, has its origin in this
statute and has incorporated its language with only slight changes in phraseology). It
is argued that this act is strong evidence of a Congressional intent that the sixth amendment did not require assignment of counsel to indigents. See Holtzoff, Right of Counsel
Under the Sixth Avnendnent, 20 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1944). The sixth amendment also
was interpreted by state courts to impose no duty on the states to provide counsel for
indigents. E.g., State v. Murphy, 87 N.J. Law 515, 94 Atl. 640 (1915) ; McDonald v.
Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 53 N.E. 874 (1899); Houk v. Montgomery County
Com'rs, 14 Ind. App. 662, 41 N.E. 1068 (1895).
10. The practice was not universal and there was wide disagreement as to what
types of cases should require appointment. Some courts appointed counsel in every case
involving a major offense while others would not do so unless the defendant made a
specific request for assigned counsel. Generally no effort was made to appoint counsel
when a plea of guilty was entered. Holtzoff, supra note 9, at 8.
11. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In this case the petitioner attacked a prior conviction by
writ of habeas corpus claiming that denial of counsel to an indigent is a denial of constitutional rights. The court stated: "If an accused . . . is not represented by counsel
and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the sixth
amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving
him of his life or his liberty." Id. at 468. The Court quoted again the broad language
of Justice Sutherland in Powell. Id. at 463.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), citing Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) ; Walker v.
Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) ; FFD. R. CRIm. P. 44.
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The language of Johnson v. Zerbst appeared to extend this right
even to proceedings prior to the time of arraignment," but subsequent
decisions refuted this implication. 4 Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which when enacted in 1944 was declared to be "a
restatement of existing law in regard to the defendant's right of counsel
as defined in recent decisions,""' provides that "if the defendant appears
in court without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel
and assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceedings unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel."" 0
It is now established that the rule only relates to proceedings in court and
was not intended to invest the defendant with a right of counsel at the
time he first appears before a committing magistrate. 7 But while it is
clear that the right of assigned counsel both under Rule 44 and the sixth
amendment does not apply to proceedings prior to arraignment in the
trial court,"8 it is not certain whether an indigent may insist on advice of
counsel before pleading at arraignment. The older and probably the majority view is that denial of counsel when pleading at arraignment is a
denial of constitutional rights only when there is no intelligent and com13. "He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him." Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 12, at 463. The only issue directly before
the court, however, was the effect of the denial of counsel at the time of trial. The
court pointed out that counsel had represented both defendants at the preliminary hearing. Also, emphasis was placed upon the destructive effect which a denial of counsel
can have on the constitutional guarantee of the right to be heard. Id. at 460.
14. In Woods v. United States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that an accused has a right of assigned counsel
at the preliminary hearing since "the aid of counsel in preparation would be farcical if
the case could be foreclosed by preliminary inquisition which would squeeze out convictions or prejudice -by means unconstitutional if used at the trial." Id. at 271. However,
two years later the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion
upon the rationale that a "preliminary hearing" was not a "trial" but merely an "ex
parte" proceeding. Burall v. Johnston, 146 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 887 (1945). Accord, Setser v. Welch, 159 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; United
States v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905 (D.D.C. 1961); Bryant v. United States, 173 F.
Supp. 574 (D.N.D. 1959). These later cases represent the great weight of authority.
Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal Proccdnre, 19 U.
PiTt. L. REv. 489, 504-05, 527-28 (1958). MORELAND, MODERN CRI aINAL PROCEDURE
177 (1959).

15. RULES, FED. CODE ANN. at 43. It is also stated: "The present extent of the
right of counsel has been defined recently in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ;
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1944) ; and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942). The rule is a restatement of the principles enunciated in these decisions." Ibid.
However, none of these three cases makes a specific distinction as to proceedings prior
to the time of arraignment.
16. FED. R. CRIm. P. 44.
17. RuLEs, FED. CODE AN. at 43. It should also be noted that in Rule 5(b) the
word "retain" was inserted between "right to" and "counsel" when the provision of the
Rules for Commissioners' statement was changed from its original status as Rule 6(a)
to its present place in the Rules.
18. MORELAND, op. cit. supra note 14, at 177-79.
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prehending waiver and a guilty plea is accepted under circumstances
which indicate the defendant was not denied a fair and equitable hearing."9
On the other hand, it should be noted that there is an increasing number
of cases which emphasize that a federal criminal defendant who is formally charged by indictment or information has a right of counsel prior
to pleading to the charge, on the theory that the right arises when he is
formally charged.2"
By comparison, there are very few cases which discuss the extent of
the right to retain counsel which is conferred by the sixth amendment;
19. See, e.g., Starks v. United States, 264 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1959); Ruebush v.
United States, 206 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1953) ; Mills v. United States, 185 F.2d 137 (5th
Cir. 1950) ; Snell v. United States, 174 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Willis v. Hunter,
166 F.2d 721 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 848 (1948) ; Von Moltke v. Gillies, 161
F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) ; In re Reed, 158
F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; Rawls v. United States, 162 F.2d 798 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 781 (1947) ; Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1944). If a federal
defendant pleads not guilty at arraignment, even though his request for assignment of
counsel was denied, the later assignment of counsel to represent him during the trial will
prevent a denial of constitutional guarantees and there is no right to relief from a conviction by way of habeas corpus. Council v. Clemmer, 177 F.2d 22, 23 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 880 (1949) ; Wilfong v. Johnston, 156 F.2d 507, 508-09 (9th Cir.
1946) ; Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 875 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945) ;
Thompson v. King, 107 F.2d 307, 308-09 (8th Cir. 1939) ; DeMaurez v. Swope, 104 F.2d
758, 759 (9th Cir. 1939). Further, under similar circumstances, even if a defendant
pleads guilty the courts refuse to grant relief if the defendant was later assigned counsel and changed his plea to not guilty or had sufficient opportunity to do so. Young v.
United States, 228 F.2d 693, 694 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 913 (1955) ; Alexander v. United States, 136 F.2d 783, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; McJordan v. Huff, 133 F.2d
408, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Council v. Clemmer, supra (dictum). (It should also be
noted that more liberal withdrawal of guilty pleas is now possible under Rule 32(d)
than previously was the case.) The courts have reached the same conclusion when the
facts and circumstances are such that there is a waiver of assistance of counsel. Walker
v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941) (district court failed to make finding on issue of
waiver) ; Starks v. United States, 264 F.2d 797, 799 (4th Cir. 1959) ; Snell v. United
States, 174 F.2d 580, 581-82 (10th Cir. 1949); Willis v. Hunter, 166 F.2d 721, 723
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 848 (1948) ; Von Moltke v. Gillies, supra at 116.
20. E.g., Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 252 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 371
U.S. 872 (1962) ; Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Gilmore v.
United States, 129 F.2d 199, 203 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 631 (1942) ; Bryant
v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 574, 580 (D.N.D. 1959) ; United States v. Levine, 127 F.
Supp. 653 (D. Mass. 1055) (citing Gilmore v. United States, supra) ; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941) (dictum). It should be emphasized that all of these cases,
although speaking in unequivocal terms of the right of counsel following indictment or
filing of an information did go further and examine the particular facts and circumstances to determine if the defendant was in fact denied a fair and equitable hearing.
These seemingly strong statements may therefore be merely dicta. Also, it has been
held that a defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel at the time of arraignment
whether he pleads guilty or not. Michener v. Johnson, 141 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir.
1944); Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1942). See generally Holtzoff,
supra note 9, at 11-12. However, it has been claimed that the majority view is contrary.
Fellman, The ConstitutionalRight to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. REv. 559,
589 (1951) citing Hiatt v. Gann, 170 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
920 (1949) ; Orfield, Arraignment in Federal Criminal Procedure, 20 LA. L. REv. 1, 21
(1959).
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'therefore it is difficult to clearly determine whether the protection it affords is of a lesser degree for the indigent than for those individuals able
to retain counsel. It is fundamental that a federal criminal defendant
has an absolute right under the sixth amendment to be represented by
retained counsel of his own choice at the time he appears in court," and
as has been noted similar protection is now guaranteed to indigents
through Johnson v. Zerbst. In one case where the dismissal of an indictment was sought by a defendant who had retained counsel, it was
stated that the "right to the assistance of counsel accrues with the returning of the indictments against him."22 The court emphasized that
a denial of assistance of counsel at the grand jury stage or in the preliminary investigatory stages was not a "violation of constitutional rights
which would affect the fairness of his trial."2 2 But those few courts
which have discussed the right of retained counsel have refused to extend
absolutely the guarantees of the sixth amendment to those proceedings
prior to the time of arraignment. 21 It thus appears that no major distinction is made between the time at which the federal criminal defendant
is assigned or allowed to retain counsel under the sixth amendment.
Another question of particular difficulty to the courts has been
whether denial to an indigent of counsel at a particular time in the proceedings will constitute a denial of due process under the requirements
of the fifth amendment in federal prosecutions or the fourteenth amendment in state prosecutions. 25 The Supreme Court has established the
21. Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298, 301 (1961). The same right is guaranteed to a criminal defendant in a state prosecution. Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S.
287, 294 (1959) ; Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1954).
22. United States v. Levine, 127 F. Supp. 651, 653 (D. Mass. 1955). See, however, the cases in note 20 supra which have held that the right of an indigent to have
counsel assigned also arises at the time he is "charged" by indictment or information.
23. Ibid. It should be noted that this issue was not directly before the court so this
statement was dictum. Also, no consideration was given to the effect of Rule 5 on the
right to be represented by retained counsel at the preliminary hearing.
24. See, e.g., Escute v. Delgado, 282 F.2d 335 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365

U.S. 883 (1961) ; United States v. Washington, 237 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1960) ; But see
Woods v. United States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (indigent has constitutional
right to assigned counsel at preliminary examination if in the nature of a "judicial
proceeding") ; United States v. Corn, 54 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Wis. 1944) (defendant
waived constitutional right to be represented by retained counsel at preliminary examination).
25. The application of the fifth amendment has not caused as much difficulty and
litigation as has the application of the fourteenth amendment. No case questioning
whether a denial of assigned counsel is a violation of the due process requirement of the
fifth amendment has ever reached the Supreme Court. There are, however, many such
cases applying the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444
(1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). This great disparity in litigation
seems to indicate that the sixth amendment and Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Crim-

NOTES
"fair trial" test to determine if the defendant in state criminal prosecutions has been denied due process under the fourteenth amendment."8 The
"fair trial" test is not limited to denial of counsel to indigents at the time
of trial but is applied to all types of problems relating to denial of counsel,
both retained and assigned, at any step of the proceedings.2" In those
cases not covered by the sixth amendment federal courts have applied the
due process requirement of the fifth amendment by employing the same
standard used under the fourteenth amendment in state prosecutions.
By analogy, therefore, a criminal defendant does not have any greater
right to assistance of counsel under the protection of the fifth amendment than a state criminal defendant has under the fourteenth. In the
absence of other circumstances which show that a defendant has in fact
been denied a fair trial, the due process requirement of the fifth amendinal Procedure have clearly defined the rights of the indigent, thus assuring uniform
compliance by the courts.
26. This doctrine was first espoused in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). The
court said: "[Tihe fourteenth amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of
one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right,
and while the want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in
such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the amendment embodies an inexorable
command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and
justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel." Id. at 473. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), specifically reversed that portion of Betts which had
held that "appointment of counsel [at the time of trial] is not a fundamental right,
essential to a fair trial." It did not, however, also reject the fair trial test. In interpreting the term "fair trial," the Supreme Court in Gideon once more looked to the
language of Justice Sutherland in Powell. The protection afforded indigents under the
fourteenth amendment in state prosecutions was expanded by Gideon to make it coextensive with that in federal criminal prosecutions under the sixth amendment. There
was no indication that the Courts meant thereby to greatly expand the concept of due
process when applied to an indigent's right of counsel regardless of the time of the proceedings at which a request is first denied. The "fair trial" test has, however, been
criticized because of its retrospective nature and because it guarantees a right that is
incapable of precise definition. Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MiNN.
L. REv. 771, 779 (1961).
27. Assistance of appointed or retained counsel prior to trial is not, in the absence
of other circumstances, essential to a fair trial. See, e.g., Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S.
504 (1958) (consulting retained counsel during police questioning); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (denial of opportunity to engage counsel) ; Escute v. Delgado, 282 F.2d 335 (1st Cir. 1960) cert. denied, 365 U.S. 883 (1961); Buchanan v.
O'Brien, 181 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1950) ; Griffith v. Rhay, 177 F. Supp. 386 (S.D. Wash.
1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1015 (1961) (assignment of counsel during investigative
stages) ; Application of Lyda, 154 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (denial of counsel at
preliminary examination) ; Rogers v. Cummings, 154 F. Supp. 663 (D. Conn. 1956) rev'd
on other grounds, 252 F.2d 807 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 220 (1958) ; Ex Parte
Lee, 123 F. Supp. 439 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 217 F.2d 647 (1st Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348

U.S. 975 (1955).

28. The courts have not specifically talked in terms of the "fair trial" test but
they have in fact looked at all the circumstances to determine if the rights of the defendant have been adequately protected. See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 270 F.2d
772 (8th Cir. 1959); Sherman v. United States, 241 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.) cert. denied,
354 U.S. 911 (1957); United States v. Helwig, 159 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1947); United
States cx rel. Stidham v. Swope, 96 F. Supp. 773 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
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ment does not comprehend anything more than is guaranteed by the
sixth amendment. 9
In the application of the "fair trial" concept of the fifth and the
fourteenth amendments the courts have not made any legal distinction
between a denial of a request to retain counsel and denial of a request to
have counsel assigned."0 However, in one case the Supreme Court held
that forcing a defendant in a state criminal prosecution to plead to an
information without the assistance of retained counsel, whose presence
he had requested, is "a denial of petitioner's right to a fair trial."'" The
Court specifically refused to consider whether the same rule would apply
if an indigent defendant requested assignment of counsel under similar
circumstances. In another case the Supreme Court stated that "when...
charges are made in a criminal proceeding, he [the defendant] then may
demand the presence of his [retained] counsel for his defense. Until
then his protection is the privilege against self-incrimination." 32 Therefore, with the possible exception of the time of arraignment, there is little
distinction made between one's right to retained or assigned counsel under
the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.33 Also,
as previously noted, there is no distinction made under the sixth amendment-again with the possible exception of the arraignment period-between the right of retained and assigned counsel for an accused indigent.
Any disparity in the right to assigned and retained counsel which could
be occasioned in those federal districts that have held the indigent has no
29. As was stated in Escute v. Delgado, 282 F.2d 335, 339 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 883 (1961), "representation by counsel prior to trial is not an absolute requirement of due process of law." Denial of counsel at some stage before trial may produce an element of unfairness amounting to a denial of due process. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958). However, it has been pointed out that "no decision
has yet gone so far. The 'unfairness' does not arise from the absence of counsel alone
but must take some other form." Beaney, supra note 26, at 772 n. 9.
30. Compare Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) and Crooker v. California,
357 U.S. 433 (1958) with Escute v. Delgado, 282 F.2d 335 (1st Cir. 1960) and United
States v. Washington, 237 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1956) and Griffith v. Rhay, 177 F. Supp.
386 (E.'D. Wash. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1015 (1961), and Application of Lyda, 154
F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
31. House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945). Accord, Washington v. United States,
297 F.2d 342, 343 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 370 U.S. 949 (1962). A similar result was
reached in a case involving the issue of assignment of counsel at arraignment even
though defendant pleaded not guilty. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). How,ever, in that case the court emphasized that arraignment in Alabama, where the case
arose, is a critical stage in the proceedings because only then may the defense of insanity be pleaded and any pleas in abatement or motion challenging the composition of
the grand jury be made. Id. at 53-55.
32. It re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957). Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287,
294 (1959), also stated that although a defendant has an unqualified right to be represented at trial by retained counsel, this right has not been extended to the investigative
"stages of such proceedings.
- " 33. See cases cited in note 20 supra.
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constitutional right to counsel when entering his plea at arraignment, has
been vitiated by the near uniform practice of district courts to delay
arraignment for those who appear and desire assigned counsel's assistance."' Thus, practically speaking, any prejudice to an indigent in the
federal courts is not based on constitutional interpretation of the right
to counsel.
Right to Counsel and the Federal Rules. The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure have not guaranteed the indigent the same degree of
"equal justice" as has been provided by the constitutional provisions examined above. While Rule 44'" has served very effectively in assuring
compliance by the courts with the ruling of Johnson v. Zerbst, and
though it speaks of representation "at every stage of the proceedings," the
rule dearly was not intended to expand further the right recognized in
Johnson for the indigent usually first appears before the court at the time
of arraignment." Since the trial court has the duty of protecting the
accused's right of counsel,"7 Rule 44 merely establishes procedures to ensure that this duty is not overlooked and, in the absence of waiver, places
upon the court responsibility for assigning counsel to the indigent.3"
Rule 5 also addresses itself to the right of counsel. Section (b) assures early access to retained counsel, but there is no mention in that rule
of assigned counsel for the indigent. 9 The extent of the right conferred
by Rule 5(b) has only recently been carefully analyzed in United States
v. Killough," where the court pointed out that "the right to counsel given
34.

It is the general practice of federal courts to delay arraignment for those in-

digents who request assigned counsel. See Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 591 (1963) ; A-rY.

GEN.,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

24 (Feb. 25, 1963) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
35. "If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise him
of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceedings unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel." FED.
R. CRIm. P. 44. For illustrative cases where such advice was given see Ray v. United
States, 192 F.2d 658, 659 (5th Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Von der Heide, 169 F. Supp.
560, 562 (D.D.C. 1959); United States v. Christakos, 83 F. Supp. 521, 524-27 (N.D.
Ala. 1949), aff'd, 178 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1950).
36. See notes 15 and 17 supra and accompanying text. It has been interpreted that
a defendant "appears" when he is arraigned. Orfield, Arraignment in Federal Criminal
Procedure,20 LA. L. REv. 1, 28 (1959).
37. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942).
38. These same duties had in effect been imposed on the court by Johnson v. Zerbst.
Holtzoff, supra note 9, at 9.
39. Under section 5 (b) the commissioner is required to inform the defendant when
he first appears of his "right to retain counsel." (Emphasis added.) That this distinction was intended seems clear. See note 17 supra; Orfield, Proceedings Before the Cornnissionerin Federal Criminal Procedure, 19 U. PITT. L. REv. 489, 561-62 (1958).
40. 193 F. Supp. 905 (D.D.C. 1961) ; revd on other groutnds, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
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by Rule 5 (b) is a limited one, being only the right to retain counsel; in
other words, no right to counsel is given by the Rule itself to indigents,
even for formal representation at the preliminary hearing. 41 The effect
of Rule 5 (b) has been to create a right to assistance of retained counsel
early in the criminal prosecution.'
Rule 5 (b) places a duty upon committing magistrates to inform the defendant of this right to retain counsel just as Rule 44 requires courts to inform an indigent of his right to
have counsel assigned." The fact that very few cases have questioned
the extent of the right to retained counsel established by Rule 5 (b) indicates that courts have been liberal in allowing consultation with retained counsel as early as the preliminary examination.
Therefore, the legal and practical effect of the Federal Rules has
been to guarantee assistance of counsel during the earlier stages of the
proceedings to those able to provide for their own defense. The indigent, however, under the fifth and sixth amendments and Rule 44 has
only been extended this protection at or subsequent to the time of arraignment. Whether Rule 5 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
created the distinction in the time at which federal criminal defendants
are entitled to enlist the services of an attorney, or merely recognized a
de facto distinction which already existed can be argued. In either case,
however, the Supreme Court has accepted this differentiation as its policy
by adoption of the rule. The fundamental question thus raised by the
proposed amendments is whether this distinction should be abolished by
providing counsel for indigents at some time prior to his first appearance
in court at arraignment.
II.

THE INEQUITIES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION

Two common charges of invidious treatment of indigents in the federal courts are (1) that because the indigent does not have access to
counsel as early in the proceedings as do those able to retain counsel he
is effectively denied many important pr-arraignment rights and im41. Id. at 914. See also, Note of Advisory Committee [to Rule 44], RuLVs, FED.
CODE ANN. at 43. The court points to the changes that were made in the preliminary
draft of this rule and places special emphasis on the insertion of the word "retain."
See note 17 supra.
42. United States v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905 (D.D.C. 1961), rezvd on other
grounds, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner
in Federal Criminal Procedure,19 U. PiTT. L. REv. 489, 504-05, 562 (1958). Cf., Beaney,
supra note 26, at 776. The defendant does not, however, have the right to be present or
have counsel when the commissioner is passing on the question of whether to issue a
warrant of arrest. Orfield, Warrant of Arrest and Summons Upon Complaint in Federal Criminal Procedure,27 U. CINc. L. REv. 1, 25 (1958).
43. United States v. Bradford, 122 F. Supp. 915, 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). See also,
United States v. Skeeters, 122 F. Supp. 52, 56 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
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munities, and (2) the "quality" of the assistance of counsel which a defendant receives under the present assignment machinery is in many cases
questionable. Because establishment of these two assertions seems necessary to justify adoption of the proposed changes to Rules 44 and 5, the
arguments must be examined to determine their validity.
Failure to obtain an "early" assignment of counsel has created three
primary problems for the indigent. The first is that the indigent, because he is generally unable to post bail following arrest, is more amenable
to the investigatory agencies for questioning than is the defendant able
to provide bail and thereby secure his release."4 The result of this fact,
coupled with a late assignment of counsel which deprives him of any
legal advice, is that the indigent is far more likely to make voluntary
though highly incriminating statements while detained pending arraignment than is the defendant who is able to retain counsel, and he will also
be more vulnerable to the possibility that a confession could be coerced
from him and used against him in court.
Prior to appearance before the United States Commissioner all federal criminal defendants are accorded similar protection from overzealous
police investigation; all must rely on their privilege against selfincrimination if they wish to remain silent,4 5 and, in a subsequent court
proceeding, all may exclude any confession obtained during an illegal detention caused by failure to be promptly taken before the committing
magistrate."0 Similarly, during this period all federal defendants can be
44.

Orfield, Proceedhigs Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal Procedure,

19 U. PITT. L. REv. 489, 564 (1958).
45. See text accompanying note 32 supra. Of course the fact that a confession is
made while the defendant is in the custody of the police does not render it inadmissible.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 346 (1943). It also noted that "unlike England . . . we have no specific provisions of law governing federal law enforcement
officers in procuring evidence from persons held in custody." Id. at 345-46.
When the defendant has been advised of his right against self-incrimination he has
no absolute right to be represented by counsel during police interrogation. Escute v.
Delgado, 282 F.2d 335, 336 (1st Cir. 1960) ; Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335,
338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Begalke v. United States, 286 F.2d 606, 609 (Ct. Cl.) cert. denied, 364 U.S. 865 (1960). It is not certain in these cases what emphasis the court intended to place on the fact that the defendant was notified of his right to remain silent.
Two cases have gone further and held that investigating officers may confer with an
accused without notifying his counsel if the requirement of voluntariness is met. Feguer
v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 251 (8th Cir.), cert. deied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962) ; Heideman v. United States, 259 F.2d 943, 945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 959
(1959).
46. The present Rule 5(a) has given protection to all defendants, for it requires
that "an officer making an arrest . . . take the arrested person without unnecessary
delay before the nearest available Commissioner. . . ." FED. R. CRIm. P. 5. The Supreme Court has given this rule heightened significance through its decision in McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) that any confession obtained during an illegal detention caused by a failure to promptly take an arrested person before a committing
magistrate must be excluded in a federal prosecution. See Upshaw v. United States,
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equally prejudiced by later admission in court of voluntary statements
given while legally detained,4 7 and in some districts this is so whether or
not they have been expressly informed of their privilege against selfincrimination.4" But when federal criminal defendants are taken before
a committing magistrate the similarity comes to an abrupt halt. At that
time the defendant with means may insist on his right to the presence of
retained counsel 9 and can also secure his release if the offense with which
he is charged is bailable.5" The indigent, in sharp contrast, must face the
commissioner alone, and if the latter finds probable cause that an offense
has been committed and the defendant committed it, he is subsequently
returned to jail and is without the assistance of counsel until brought
before the court at arraignment. 5
Thus the indigent, prior to assignment of counsel, is at a marked
335 U.S. 410, 411-13 (1948), McNabb's progeny. But cf. note 47 infra. In determining
what constitutes an "unreasonable delay" the courts will look to the facts and circumstances in the particular case. Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781, 797-98 (9th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960) ; In re Morgan, 80 F. Supp. 810 (N.D. Iowa
1948). The effect of the McNabb rule has been to assure compliance with Rule 5(a)
and give more protection to all arrested persons prior to appearing 'before the commissioner.
47. United States v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962). For two cases which have held such confessions to be admissible, see United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 69-70 (1944) (voluntary confession following arrest admissible despite subsequent illegal detention) ; Heideman v. United States, 259 F.2d 943, 945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 959
(1959). It has been suggested that delay in bringing a defendant before a committing
magistrate may be condoned where the police officer gives the defendant the advisory
statement which a commissioner would give under Rule 5(b). Orfield, Procedings Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal Procedure, 19 U. PITT. L. REv. 489, 543-44
(1958).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 237 F.2d 632, 633 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 938 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860
(1949) ; Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; United States v.
Wheeler, 172 F. Supp. 278, 283 (W.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 275 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1960) ;
United States v. Simpson, 162 F. Supp. 677, 683 (D.D.C. 1958) ; United States v. Popworth, 156 F. Supp. 843, 847-48 (N.D. Tex. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1959).
49. See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
50. "[T]he Commissioner . . . shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in
these rules." FED. R. Cium. P. 5(b).
51. "In most federal districts appointed counsel first enters the case when the accused is brought before the court on arraignment and is required to plead to the indictment." REPORT, p. 24. The REPORT has made it clear that there is indeed a significant
period of time which generally elapses between an indigent's arrest and his appointment
of counsel. The committee determined that in the majority of federal courts counsel is not
assigned until the defendant appears before the court for arraignment. Id. at 24. It also
found that the average period of detention for federal defendants is 25.3 days, and that
as the great majority of federal criminal cases are terminated by guilty pleas immediately upon appearance before the court, the greatest period of detention occurs between
arrest and arraignment. Id. at 65. When these findings are juxtaposed it is immediately plain that in most districts the indigent defendant is held in custody, without the
benefit of counsel, for two to three weeks, and it is during this period that he is subject to reasonable interrogation.
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disadvantage. The Supreme Court in the exercise of its supervisory
powers over the practice and procedure of lower federal courts has not
yet extended the McNabb v. United States rationale to bar admission into
evidence of a voluntary confession given during a period of legal detention after appearance before the commissioner and prior to the time at
which the right to assigned counsel accrues. 2 Therefore, the only two
means of protection afforded the indigent during this stage of the proceedings against him are the lingering admonition of the committing
magistrate that incriminatory statements will be used against him, and
his privilege against admission in court of a coerced confession and any
illegally obtained evidence. 3 But the commissioner's reminder to the
indigent of his right to remain silent in the very nature of things is no
52. To say that the Supreme Court has not extended the McArabb rationale to this
period is not to discount that it would do so if given the chance. Four members of the
present court have expressly opined that a confession obtained from a defendant without
counsel after he has been formally charged and his right to retain counsel has accrued,
even if voluntarily given, is a denial of the constitutional guaranty of the right to counsel under Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) in a capital case. Spano V. New York,
360 U.S. 315, 326-7 (1959) (Douglas, Stewart, J. J., concurring). Because the power
of the Supreme Court over lower federal courts to exclude confessions is not limited to
constitutional grounds, but extends to their exclusion for reasons of civilized practice
and procedure, United States v. Carrigan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1961), Gallegos v. Nebraska,
342 U.S. 55, 63-4 (1951) (Reed, Vinson, Burton, Clark, J.J., concurring), United States
v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 67-8 (1944), McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), it
would be a short hop from the minority decision in Spano to the exclusion in a federal
criminal trial of any confession taken after a defendant has been examined and formally
charged.
One federal court has expressly held that a voluntary confession, given after appearance before a commissioner but prior to the time that right to counsel accrues, is
admissible at trial when it appears that at the time the statement was made the defendant was aware of his right to remain silent. United States v. Moore, 290 F.2d 436
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 858 (1961).
53. In a federal criminal proceeding the test as to the admissibility of a confession
is "whether it was made 'freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of
any sort,'" Carrigan v. United States, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1951) quoting Wilson v. United
States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896), and whether its admission is in accordance with the "civilized standards" of practice and procedure which should govern federal court procedure.
See cases cited supra, note 52.
It is, of course, an oversimplification to say that only illegally obtained confessions
are excluded from evidence. Closely related to the problem of involuntary confessions
is the far more subtle problem of excluding information obtained from an accused
which is not incriminating in itself but which leads to other discoveries that are indeed
damaging, and incriminating facts which have been derived from a confession, later excluded by court, which in themselves will convict the accused. In an effort to extend
the protection afforded an accused courts have developed the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine 'by which even the indirect use of illegally obtained evidence is barred.
This doctrine has been discussed in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) ; United States v. CopIon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950). In Nardone v. United States, supra, it is pointed out
that when the connection between the evidence and the illegal acts has become "so attenuated as to dissipate that taint" the rule should not stand as a bar to the introduction of

the evidence. Id. at 341.
226 (1959).

See

MAGuiRE, EVIDENCE OF

GUILT at 70-71, 148, 152, 161, 225-
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substitute to the advice of personal counsel, nor are the rules which exclude statements and evidence illegally obtained from the indigent after
appearance before a commissioner any substitute to a bailed defendant's
relative immunity from coercive interrogation and his close touch with
counsel. Of course this is not to say that the constitutional and evidentiary safeguards are inadequate per se; few would maintain that there
is a shocking unfairness and injustice in admitting against a defendant
a wholly voluntary confession of guilt merely because given after his
appearance before a commissioner. But there is, nevertheless, a significant disparity in the protection afforded a federal criminal defendant's
personal liberties and freedoms in this realm which is attributable solely
to his financial status, and the disparity should not be countenanced since
it can be remedied to a great extent merely by earlier assignment of
counsel. " It is quite true that there is an impressive lack of cases where
federal courts have found it necessary to check investigatory practices of
federal authorities, but abuse is nonetheless a possibility.
Closely allied to the problem of coerced confessions is the danger
that an uncounseled defendant will make incriminating statements before
the United States Commissioner. In the early case of Wilson v. United
States,5 the Supreme Court allowed statements which had been made by
the defendant before the commissioner to subsequently be used against
him." The drafters of present Rule 5 (b), aware of the consequences
54. Advice of counsel at the earliest possible moment after arrest is the best method
to assure protection of an individual's personal freedoms and liberties. United States v.
Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905, 916 (D.D.C. 1961). However, it must be realized that injection of the lawyer into most situations where interrogation is required would mean
that the accused would not talk.
To subject one without counsel to questioning which may and is intended to
convict him, is a real peril to individual freedom. To bring in a lawyer means
peril to solution of the crime, because, under our adversary system, he deems
that his sole duty is to protect his client-guilty or innocent-and that in such
a capacity he owes no duty whatever to help society solve its crime problem.
Under this conception of criminal procedure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell
the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to the police under any
circumstances.
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949). See generally MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 23844 (1942). Access to counsel in the proceedings to the degree presently allowed for
those able to retain counsel seems an intelligent balance between the two conflicting
interests.
55. 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
56. The statements were not an admission of guilt by the defendant but instead led
to the basis of attack. The court treated the statements as a confession and ruled that
failure to inform defendant of his right to counsel would only effect the weight and
credibility of the statements. Id. at 623-24. The Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision also
refused to exclude, in a state prosecution, admissions made by an accused in a hearing
before a fire warden on the grounds that this was essentially an administrative investigation. The defendant's request for assistance of retained counsel had been denied. 12 re
Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 332 (1957). It was proposed that the Federal Rules of Criminal
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which could befall the defendant should he inadvertently make an incriminating statement, therefore required that the commissioner "inform
the defendant that he is not required to make a statement and that any
statement made by him may be used against him.

'

7

But it is doubtful

that the commissioner's admonition would in all cases suffice to render
a defendant's statement made after such a warning admissible; a different result might be reached if a request to consult counsel has been denied, and such a possibility seems most likely if the request is for retained rather than assigned counsel."8 This is so because, as has been
noted above, while a defendant does have a right to be represented by
retained counsel at the preliminary examination, as to an indigent "the
magistrate's warning-and not additional advice from counsel-would
be sufficient to comply with any requirement operative at this stage of
the proceedings that an accused have knowledge of the privilege [against
self-incrimination]."" By comparison, a defendant able to retain counsel can if he desires have his preliminary hearing postponed until he
secures the assistance of counsel,6" and it has even been suggested "that
refusal to allow retained counsel to participate at the Commissioner's
hearing, or at any subsequent time would render inadmissible any confession made subsequent to such denial."6 1
Procedure should make any statement made before the magistrate inadmissible in evidence. However, the final wording of Rule 5 refutes any such implication. Orfield,
Proceedings Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal Procedure, 19 U. PiTT. L.
REv. 489, 490, 562 (1958).
57. FED. R. CRIm. P. 5(b).
58. See Beaney, supra note 26, at 776.
59. United States v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905, 915 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd on oter
grounds, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The court stated that this was the intent of the
rule makers in the formulation of Rule 5 and therefore refused to take "a novel approach to application of the Rules." Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Beaney, supra note 26, at 776. The author even suggests that the Supreme
Court could, in the exercise of its general supervisory powers, exclude confessions made
subsequent to a denial of access to retained counsel when there had not yet been an
appearance before the commissioner. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 438
(1958) : "To be sure, coercion seems more likely to result from state denial of a specific
request for opportunity to engage counsel than it does from state failure to appoint
counsel immediately upon arrest." The concurring opinion in Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315, 359-60 (1959) states that a denial of assistance of retained counsel following
an indictment for a capital offense renders any subsequent confession inadmissible under
the fourteenth amendment in a state prosecution. If the issue were directly presented
it has been argued "that a majority of the Court would support the proposition that at
least after indictment it is a denial of due process in a capital case to refuse defendant's
request to see his lawyer. . . ." Beaney, supra note 26, at 778. Because the Supreme
Court exercises broad supervisory powers over the federal courts a confession obtained
under these circumstances would clearly be excluded in a federal prosecution. It also has
been implied that a confession obtained during interrogation following a denial of assistance of retained counsel, even in the early stages of the proceeding, would be excluded in a federal prosecution under the general supervisory powers of the Supreme
Court. Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1958).

'iSO
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It is not suggested that the protection afforded the indigent at the
preliminary examination stage by the commissioner's reminder of his
right not to incriminate himself is so illusory as to constitute no protection at all. But it is asserted that the declared necessity of the indigent
to rely on the statement of the commissioner is incongruous when juxtaposed to the established right of the defendant with financial resources
to have counsel by his side during the examination. Indeed, it has been
stated that the early assistance of counsel is "more valuable to the illiterate and inexperienced than to the educated and well-briefed accused." 62 Since most indigents are of this former class the greater emphasis which the courts have placed on the importance of retained counsel during preliminary examination cannot be justified by legal analysis;
such emphasis is explicable only by the realization that extension of this
privilege to the indigent would impose an added burden upon the bar and
the courts.
The third problem that arises due to "late" assignment of counsel
is that an indigent, especially one who is illiterate and uneducated, cannot
without the assistance of counsel effectively exercise many of the rights
which accrue to him prior to arraigm-nent. There are far too many such
rights to permit examination of each one, but the inadequacies in the
present system in this regard are evident from a few examples.6 3
One pre-arraignment right which it has been established the defendant may waive, and one which almost all indigents in the federal
courts do not insist upon,6" is that of an appearance before a United
States Commissioner for a preliminary examination.6" For years federal
courts held that such a waiver not only dispensed with any necessity for
the hearing itself, but also foreclosed any opportunity for the defendant
to object to informalities or irregularities in the complaint upon which
62. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 424 (1948).
63. Rights not here considered are, consolidated trials; motion to withdraw a guilty
plea under Rule 32(d) and motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958) ; requiring
an illiterate to submit a written motion or challenge. See generally Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) ; Orfield, Relief fromn PrejudicialJoinder in Federal Criminal
Cases, 36 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 276, 495 (1961). Orfield, Pleas in Federal Criminal Procedure, 35 NoTRE DAwE LAw. 1 (1959; Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 560, 521 (1962)
Douglas, J., concurring).

64. REPoRT at 24.
65. "The Commissioner shall inform the defendant of his right . . . to have a
preliminary examination. . . ." FFa. R. CGIm. P. 5(b). This language makes it clear
that the federal defendant has no unqualified right to a preliminary examination. United
States v. Davis, 92 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mont. 1949). It should be noted that in Davis the
court did look to the intelligence and understanding of the defendant in making the
Waiver. Id. at 526.
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his arrest was based.66 It is obvious that such a waiver could be particularly damaging to the unknowledged defendant as where, for instance,
the complaint was not obtained upon the personal knowledge of the
complaining officer nor upon information and belief.
The above position has been considerably tempered by the Supreme
Court's decision in Giordenello v. United States" that a defendant can
waive only "the right which this examination was intended to secure
him-the right not to be held in the absence of finding by the Commissioner of probable cause that he has committed an offense,""3 but
Giordenello has not remedied entirely the harshness of the waiver doctrine for the indigent defendant. There are many tactical factors which
govern the wisdom of a preliminary examination waiver, viz., the necessity of cross-examining the government's witnesses for information, and
whether generally to force the prosecution to exhibit its case against the
accused; or, in the alternative, whether it would be best to suppress publicity, not perpetuate testimony, and refrain from alienating the government's witnesses in cross-examination." The indigent, without counsel
at the post-arrest stage in the proceedings, cannot waive preliminary examination with full knowledge of its consequences because of his inability to perceive and weigh such factors. Representation by counsel at
that stage would seem the only reasonable and equitable answer.
There are numerous other rights afforded early in federal criminal
proceedings which only a defendant with the aid of counsel can properly
exercise. Thus, a defendant held to answer in the district court may
raise a challenge to the array of the grand jury or to an individual juror
on the grounds that the body was improperly constituted or the individual unqualified."0 Since the defendant is not entitled to counsel during grand jury proceedings,71 and since the indigent defendant who is
66. United States v. Walker, 197 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Davis,
supra; United States v. Ruroede, 220 F. 210 (D.N.Y. 1915). Of course, as these cases
emphasize, a waiver is effective only if made intelligently, i.e., by one who understands
the nature and effect of the waiver and has been informed of his rights.
67. 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
68. Id. at 484. The court recognized the "subtlety and complexity" of the legal
issues that a question of the validity of a warrant could raise and pointed out it would
be unfair to require a defendant to raise such issues "so soon after arrest, and in many
instances . . . before his final selection of counsel." Id. at 483.
69. See generally, PAULSEN & KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 919

(1962); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Pro-

cedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
70. FED. R. CIen. P. 6; See United States v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604, 607 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 790 (1944). It should be noted that such challenges are
rarely invoked.

71. United States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 640, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United
States v. Blanton, 77 F. Supp. 812, 816-17 (E.D. Mo. 1948) ; Orfield, The Federal Grand
Jtnry, 22 F.R.D. 343, 425 (1958).
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unable to meet bail is incarcerated at that time, this right of challenge is
illusory; he has no means by which to determine the propriety of the
impanelling or the qualification of individual jurors. Further, the defendant's right to later move to dismiss the indictment, though exercisable during that period when the indigent will have counsel's assistance,
is an ineffective substitute to such assistance at the moment of actual
impanellingY
A defendant may waive prosecution by indictment pursuant to Rule
1 (b) in open court after having been advised of his rights, but here also
there is no requirement of advice from counsel before making the waiver." This right, though seemingly unimportant, can be extremely beneficial to the indigent unable to meet bail requirements for, in those districts where the grand jury meets infrequently, non-waiver may result
in months of unnecessary confinement. And, it has been said by one
authority that there is no prerequisite that a defendant act under advice
of counsel when waiving trial at the place of the offense" since he may
waive trial by jury without counsel." Although it is not clear from the
cases whether the advice of counsel is necessary for such a waiver under
Rule 20,7" it is interesting to note that the proposed amendments to section (d), which allows waiver by juveniles, will specifically require prior
advice of counsel.7
72. Under Rule 12(b) (3), a motion to dismiss an indictment or information now
is allowed within a "reasonable time" after entering a plea at arraignment. This expansion of the previous requirement that such motion be made within ten days after arraignment has served to better protect the rights of the indigent who may not have counsel
assigned until after arraignment. Two cases which consider what is a "reasonable time"
are Hanf v. United States, 235 F.2d 710, 714 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 880
(1956) (eight months not a reasonable time), and United States v. Richie, 222 F.2d 436,
437 (3d Cir. 1955) (motion must be made prior to trial). See Orfield, Pleadings and
Motions Before Trial in Federal Criminal Proceedings, 29 FORDHAm L. REV. 1, 60-61,
79-81 (1960) ; Orfield, Arraignment in Federal Criminal Procedure, 20 LA. L. REV. 1,
24 & n.7 (1959).
73. Orfield, Indictment and Information in Federal Criminal Procedure, 13 SYRAcusE L. REv. 389, 392 (1961). Several courts have in practice provided counsel at this
stage. Also, a waiver by a defendant who is unable to understand the nature of such a
waiver is void. Id. at 392 & nn. 728 & 731. One decision has allowed a waiver signed
outside of court when the defendant also appeared in court and affirmed his written
waiver. United States v. Jones, 177 F.2d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 1949).
74. Orfield, Transfer of Federal Offenses for Prejudice in the District or Division, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 21, 35 (1953).
75. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
76. By way of dictum one district court required advice of counsel as to waiver of
venue for a guilty plea. In re Schwindt, 74 F. Supp. 618 (D. Ore. 1947). See also
Hearn v. United States, 194 F.2d 647, 649 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 968 (1952).
See Orfield, The Constitutionality of Federal Criminal Rule 20, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 129,
150-151 (1948).
77. PRELIMINARY DRAFT at 14-15. By analogy it would seem a similar rule would
apply to transfers under Rule 21 as applies under Rule 20. See generally Orfield,
Transfers of Federal Offenses for Prejudice in the District or Division, 27 TEMP. L.Q.
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Finally, a defendant who desires to have a deposition taken or books,
papers, documents or tangible objects produced at trial may move the
court to order such procedures, and should the defendant desire an attorney to take depositions he is entitled to one for that purpose."5 But
once again the right thus extended is of almost no significance for the
incarcerated indigent; it is extremely doubtful that he would be aware
of his rights to discovery, and even if by chance he was apprised of the
right he would have no way of knowing whether the perpetuation of a
witness' testimony or the production of books and records was necessary for his cause."9
The federal courts have clearly recognized the adverse effects which
can flow from a defendant's uncomprehending waiver of any prearraignment right, for they have placed stringent requirements upon the
acceptance of a waiver."0 Even though the injury to an accused deprived
of one or more of these rights admittedly is not as serious as that possible from the admittance into evidence of an involuntary confession,
their maximum benefit can be realized only when exercised in a timely
and comprehending fashion. Such an exercise is possible, it is submitted, only by one acting on the advice of counsel. The application of
a type of "fair trial" test at some later stage in the proceedings is only a
substitute measure and ipso facto does not assure the same protection
for an indigent that the assistance of counsel in these matters assures
the defendant with means.8
Although related to the problem of "late" assignment, another principal cause of the alleged invidious treatment of indigents in the federal
courts seems better classified under the general heading of "quality" of
representation. Of course, the point in the proceedings at which counsel
is first assigned necessarily limits the amount of time that he can spend
interviewing witnesses, taking depositions where necessary, reviewing
the applicable law and planning for trial; and as has been said, "depriving a person formally charged with a crime of counsel during the period
prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the
21, 35 (1953) ; Orfield, Transfer of Federal Offenses Committed in More than One
District or Division, 51 MicH. L. REv. 31, 44 (1952).
78.

FED. R. CRIMI. P. 15(d).

79. There seems to be some question as to whether the court must advise the defendant of his right to take depositions or whether the defendant must first make the
request.
80. See note 66 supra.
81. A distinction based on the amount of prejudice to the defendant does not seem
justifiable. Cf. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942): "The right to have the
assistance of counsel [at trial] is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount oi prejudice arising from its denial." Id. at

76.
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trial itself."' 2 Since in many districts prosecution of the defendant unable to post bail is completed within two weeks or less of his arrest, 3 and
as in most districts the indigent does not have counsel assigned until he
appears before the court at arraignment, 4 it is apparent that appointed
counsel has only scant time in which to determine whether to contest the
government's charge and prepare for his client's defense, or to plead
guilty or nolo contendere and gather facts for presentation in attempted
mitigation of the plea. There is no fixed rule which prescribes the
amount of time that must be allowed between the appointment of counsel
and trial.8 5 In determining whether counsel has been allowed adequate
time to prepare for trial the court will look to all the facts and circumstances to determine the effect on the subsequent proceedings.8"
Even when counsel is assigned at such a late date that proper preparation for trial is impossible with poor performance the result, there is
almost no possibility that the defendant can raise a successful charge of
inadequate representation. While the right to the assistance of counsel
is fundamental and substantive, not merely formal, 7 the defendant is not
82. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 316, 325 (1959). The court, citing Powell v.
Alabama, recognized the importance of "consultation, thorough-going investigation and
preparation" during this period. Ibid. Accord, Krull v. United States, 240 F.2d 122,
126 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 915 (1957). The right of counsel guaranteed by
the fifth and sixth amendments applies both before and during the trial. Coplon v.
United States, 191 F.2d 749, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952);
Ray v. United States, 197 F.2d 268, 270 (8th Cir. 1952). See generally Beaney, Right to
Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MiNN. L. REv. 771, 781 (1961).
83. REPoRT at 65.
84. See note 51 supra.
85. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). For various cases which consider the length of time required see Fellman, supra note 20, at 586-87; Everitt v. United
States, 281 F.2d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Sherman v. United States, 241 F.2d 329, 337
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957). A person charged with crime who is able
to retain counsel must be given a reasonable time and a fair opportunity to do so.
However, this must be done in such a manner as not to impede an orderly procedure in
the court. Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir. 1961), citing Crooker
v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9 (1954).
Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Smith v. United States, 216
F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir. 1954).
86. Whether the time allowed a defendant's counsel to prepare for trial is sufficient
depends upon the nature of the charge, the issues presented, counsel's familiarity with
the applicable law and the pertinent facts and the availability of material witnsses.
Ray v. United States, 197 F.2d 268, 271 (8th Cir. 1952). Accord, United States v.
Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950); Maye v.
Pescor, 162 F.2d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Vaslick, 206 F. Supp. 195,
199 (M.D. Pa. 1962). The determining factor is the effect on the subsequent proceedings. United States v. Tribote, 297 F.2d 598, 601 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v.
Wight, supra. The defendant must show some element of prejudice from a refusal of a
request to confer as this is not a denial of due process per se. Lewis v. United States,
277 F.2d 378, 379 (10th Cir. 1960). United States v. Tribote, supra; Escute v. Delgado,
282 F.2d 335, 336 (1st Cir. 1960).
87. McGuire v. United States, 289 F.2d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1961) (fundamental
right) ; Snell v. United States, 174 F.2d 580, 581 (10th Cir. 1949) (substantive right) ;
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entitled to the most brilliant counsel, but only one whose services are not
so inferior as to deny the accused his constitutional right to counsel under
the sixth amendment."3 The courts have been very hesitant to reverse a
conviction or grant a writ of habeas corpus upon the charge of inadequate representation, due in part no doubt to the regularity with which
such charges are raised by convicted felons,"° but attributable chiefly to
the broad standard which governs the denial of such petitions. The
standard most commonly applied was set forth in Edwards v. United
States : "Mere improvident strategy, bad tactics, mistaken carelessness
or inexperience do not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel, unless taken as a whole the trial was a 'mockery of justice.' "1
There is a presumption of regularity and the courts will not review mere
errors of counsel. 2 It must be wondered when a "mockery of justice'
could ever occur when, by implication from Edwards, an inexperienced
and careless attorney exhibiting bad strategy and tactics does not necessarily suffice.
Johnson v. United States, 110 F.2d 562, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (not merely a formal
right). The duty of the court to advise the defendant of his right of counsel may not
be discharged by mere "procedural formality." Taylor v. United States, 193 F.2d 411,

412 (10th Cir. 1952).
88. United States v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1948); Baldwin v.
United States, 141 F. Supp. 310, 315 (E.D.S.C. 1956), aff'd, 260 F.2d 117 (4th Cir.
1958). It would seem that the term "counsel" as used in the sixth amendment implies a
duly licensed and qualified lawyer. People v. Cox, 12 Ill.2d 265, 267, 146 N.E.2d 19, 22
(1957) ; Higgins v. Parker, 354 Mo. 888, 890, 191 S.W.2d 668, 670, cert. denied, 327
U.S. 801 (1946).
89. "Such a charge [of ineffective counsel] should not he sustained unless it very
clearly appears to be well grounded." Gray v. United States, 299 F.2d 467, 468 (D.C.
Cir. 1962) ; Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1945). "It has been repeated so
many times as to become axiomatic that convicted felons almost unanimously relish the
prospect of putting to public judicial test the competence of their erstwhile defenders. . . ." Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 850 (1958). Accord, Gray v. United States, supra at 468. See generally Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. PxEv. 559, 592

(1951).
90. 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 857 (1958).
91. Id. at 708. Accord, United States v. Tribote, 297 F.2d 598, 601 (2d Cir. 1961);
Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838, 843 (4th Cir. 1960) (state conviction); Sherman v.
United States, 241 F.2d 329, 336 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957) ; United
States v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948) ; Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C.
Cir. 1945) ; Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889
(1945). Success is not the test for determining if a defendant had effective assistance
of counsel, as the term "effective" describes a procdural standard, not a standard of
skill for assigned counsel. Hester v. United States, 303 F.2d 47, 49 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 847 (1962); Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 789-90 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958). Some cases have seemingly placed great emphasis on the fact that no objection was made by the defendant as to his counsel or his
actions at the time of the trial. Barrett v. United States, 270 F.2d 772, 777 (8th Cir.
1959) ; Sherman v. United States, supra at 337; See generally Orfield, Pleas in Federal
Crininal Procedure,35 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 44-46 (1959).
92. Jones v. Huff, supra note 91.
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Because of the suspicion with which courts treat any charge of inadequate representation by counsel and the retrospective nature of any
such inquiry, the relief afforded an indigent from the damaging inadequacies of his appointed counsel is very narrow. The answer to the
problem does not lie with the imposition of a more strict standard than
that imposed by the Edwards case, for to do so would flood the courts
with added and unnecessary litigation. Rather, the courts must continue
to rely in large measure upon the ethics and conscience of the individual
assigned counsel, whose performance can be upgraded significantly by
appointment at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings.
From the above analysis it is clear that the indigent is not, in all
cases, receiving "equal justice" under the federal judicial system. Courts
have not merely allowed assistance of retained counsel to those with
means prior to arraignment but now consider it a right which the defendant must be accorded upon demand. Since there is no legislative or
constitutional basis for this right it must be founded on the realization
that some federal criminal defendants need this additional protection and
assistance during the early part of the proceedings, and that although
such assistance and protection is necessary in but a very small number
of cases, it would be impossible to segregate those few defendants without prejudging every case. Courts have therefore chosen to extend this
protection to all defendants who are able to retain counsel-even those
who do not need it and may possibly abuse the privilege-rather than
deny it to the few who are in real need. If this logic is sound it is without question equally applicable to the indigent.
Several approaches can be employed as a means of providing greater
protection to the indigent during the early part of the criminal proceeding. More restrictive evidentiary and procedural rules would reduce the
danger to the uncounseled indigent that illegally obtained confessions,
admissions, and incriminating statements made prior to arraignment could
be used against him during trial." A very extreme approach could be
taken and all confessions obtained during police interrogation barred.
Such a rule coupled with a very strict application of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine would give much greater protection to all criminal defendants, but would at the same time prohibitively restrict the investigatory agencies; it would not provide an intelligent balance between
the needs of society for effective law enforcement and the liberties and
freedoms of the individual. A less extreme approach would be to prescribe rules for the interrogation of prisoners while in the custody of
93. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414-15 (1948)

18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1958).

(dissenting opinion);

NOTES
police officers, a procedure which has been adopted and employed in
England.9" This approach admittedly has the advantage of establishing
definite standards of conduct and giving judicial guidance to investigatory agencies in their work.
But an alternative approach-the one proposed by the Advisory
Committee's proposed changes to the Federal Rules, and the one here
urged for adoption-is to provide counsel to indigents at some earlier
point in the proceedings. Courts have an inherent power, indeed an
obligation, to appoint counsel at any stage in the proceedings when necessary for fairness," such power being exercisable by judicial decision or
by rule of court." We have seen above how earlier appointment is undeniably necessary for fairness; it would equalize the rights of criminal
defendants in our federal courts by (1) enabling an indigent's counsel
to more adequately present mitigating circumstances upon entry of a
guilty plea,97 (2) assuring the indigent an intelligent waiver or exercise
of rights and privileges which arise prior to arraignment and (3) allowing his counsel more time in which to adequately prepare for trial when
necessary. Itremains to be determined whether the proposed amendments to Rules 5 and 44 will adequately provide equal rights to federal
criminal defendants, the result they were apparently designed to achieve.
III.

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The changes proposed by the Advisory Committee in Rule 44 are
"designed to provide for the assignment of counsel to indigent defendants
94. The English rules do not have the force of law but instead are merely guides.
Close adherence to such rules by federal investigatory agencies could be expected. For

a discussion of the English approach see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345
n. 9 (1943).

See generally MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 242-44 (1942).

95. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-72 (1942).
96. The courts could extend the protection of the fifth amendment to the earlier
parts of the proceedings, just as Johnson v. Zerbst first extended the protection of the
sixth amendment to indigents. Justification for such an extension could be the increased
emphasis which our criminal procedure has placed on pre-trial proceedings. In Counselmanw v.Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 544 (1892), it is pointed out that a criminal case under
the fifth amendment is much broader than a criminal prosecution under the sixth amendment.
Implementation of the proposed changes 'by rule of court would seem the wise
course to pursue, so as to prevent a flood of applications for writs of habeas corpus
such as followed the Johnson case. During 1943, 1944 and 1945, there were 1556 petitions by federal prisoners of which 57 were granted. From 1938 to 1941 no fewer than
75 petitions, based on the ruling in Johnson, were filed in the Northern District of California by prisoners incarcerated in Alcatraz Penitentiary. Fellman, supra note 89, at
571-72.
97. The importance of counsel in presenting mitigating circumstances has been
recognized both by the courts, and by the commentators. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332

U.S. 708, 721 (1948) ; Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 11 (1944).
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at the earliest possible time and without waiting until the defendant appears in court."9 8 These changes create for the indigent a right of early
assignment just as the original Rule 5 created a right of early assistance
of retained counsel. 9 But whether the extent of the right created by
subdivision (a) of Rule 44 is as broad as that conferred by Rule 5 to
those able to retain counsel depends on the interpretation of the term
"reasonable time," a question which is heightened by the language of
Rule 5 which prescribes that a defendant has the right to retain counsel
but only the right to request assignment of counsel. In order to assure
identical treatment for all defendants the interpretation would seem mandatory that an indigent be allowed a delay in the preliminary examination
pending assignment of counsel in view of the general practice and the
courts' recognition of the right to have preliminary examination postponed while retained counsel is sought.'
But the Advisory Committee
has wisely chosen to avoid specifying the exact moment in the proceedings when the federal judicial officer must secure counsel for the indigent. Use of the ambiguous term "reasonable time" permits courts
to exercise a measure of discretion in the application of the rule, and
such discretion is necessary for a restrictive procedural requirement
would be subject to abuse by defendants and difficult to administer as
well. Nevertheless, it is clear that an indigent could not claim a right
under subdivision (a) to have counsel assigned immediately after arrest
since this would place a more restrictive interpretation on the term "reasonable time" as used in the amendment to Rule 44 than is accorded the
term "without unnecessary" delay in the present Rule 5(a)."' There98. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 8 (Advisory Committee's Note). It is interesting to note that as support for the need of early assignment of counsel for the indigent federal criminal defendant, the Advisory Committee's Note cites three cases, all
involving state criminal prosecutions and the application of the fourteenth amendment.
Two of these, Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) and Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433 (1958) raise questions of the effect of a denial of opportunity to consult with
or obtain retained counsel. It is pointed out in Cicenia v. LaGay, supra at 508-09, that
"were this a federal prosecution we would have little difficulty in dealing with what
occurred under our general supervisory power over the administration of justice in the
federal courts." The third case, Ex Parte Sullivan, 107 F. Supp. 514 (D. Utah 1952),
raises the question of whether police officers, "after denying defendants counsel, can
continue to hound them to give evidence against themselves until there is no escape at
the trial, no possibility of a recommendation of mercy." Id. at 517.
99. In subdivision (b), the district court is charged with the duty of implementing
the right established in subdivision (a). Further, in the Advisory Committee's Note it
is stated that under subdivision (a) the indigent is "given the right" to have counsel
assigned to represent him within a reasonable time after such request. See notes 41
and 42 supra and accompanying text.
100. See Beaney, supra note 82; United States v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905, 914
(D.D.C. 1961).
101. In fact, the term "without unnecessary delay" as used in Rule 5(a) seems
to command an even greater degree of urgency.
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fore, under the proposed amendment to Rule 44, an indigent is given the
right to have counsel assigned prior to his first appearance in court, and
this right could and should be extended even to preliminary examination."0 2 But, whether the right has been accorded the indigent within a
"reasonable time" will depend on the facts and circumstances of each
particular case.
The right thus created by Rule 44(a) is extended therein to every
"defendant" who is "unable" to obtain counsel. The meaning of the
term "defendant" as used in subdivision (a) is clearly co-extensive with
its usage in the present Rule 5 ;...any person who has been arrested and
brought before a commissioner falls within that classification.
The
same standard presently used to determine indigency-whether the defendant is financially unable to retain counsel-will apply under the
amended Rule 44, but that determination would have to be made by the
court or its representative prior to the time of arraignment rather than
after the defendant "first appears in court" as the rule now requires. Because this factor will inject into many cases an additional appearance before the court or an additional proceeding prior to the time the defendant
"first appears in court," it is conceivable that further crowding of the
already jammed dockets of most courts could result. Nonetheless, the
benefits to be derived from an earlier assignment of counsel will more
than compensate for any slight addition to district court congestion the
change would necessitate.
The right which is created by the proposed amendment to Rule 44
is specifically conditioned upon a request by the defendant. That requirement would obviously avoid the problem of determining whether a
defendant has waived the right in a particular case,' an approach which
seems very desirable because it will obviate the necessity of assuring that
a waiver of the right of counsel given very early in the proceedings be
clearly documented and recorded so as to preclude a later question on the
102. The Advisory Committee's Note to the amended Rule 44 states "without waiting until defendant appears in court."
103. "Under this new subdivision (a) the defendant who is unable to obtain counsel
is given the right to have counsel assigned to represent him within a reasonable time
after he requests such assignment. Under the amendment to Rule 5(b) the commissioner is required to advise the defendant of this right." (Emphasis added.) Advisory
Committee's Note to the amendment to Rule 44, supra note 8, at 31. See also the Advisory Committee's Note to the amendment to Rule 5, supra note 8, at 2.
104. The problem of determining whether a party had waived his constitutional
right to assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment presented great difficulty
following Johnson v. Zerbst. Since it had been generally assumed that an indigent defendant had no such right most courts were not careful to make mention in the record
of a waiver. Holtzoff, supra note 97, at 10, 16. The difficulties caused by this situation
were in part responsible for legislation providing for full-time official, salaried court
reporters. Id. at 16. Fellman, supra note 89, at 566.
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issue. However, under the proposed amendment to Rule 5 (b) the commissioner is only required to inform the defendant "of his right to request the assignment of counsel."'0 5 Since the defendant must take positive steps to obtain assignment of counsel it is therefore submitted that
Rule 5 (b) should unequivocally place upon the commissioner the duty not
only of advising the accused of his right to request assignment but also of
making certain the latter fully understands the nature of the privilege and
how it must be exercised."0 6 Without such additional safeguards the
many indigents of low intellect will have difficulty understanding the
importance of the right accorded them, and could conceivably forfeit
their right of early assignment unwittingly. Because of the presumptive
validity of proceedings it will otherwise be very difficult for a defendant
to prove that he has not been informed of or understood this right to request counsel. Unlike the right of counsel at trial there will be no
counter-balancing presumption against waiver of a fundamental right.'
Under the proposed amendments it does not seem that a court's
failure to assign counsel upon proper demand will result in its loss of
jurisdiction if counsel is provided at the trial. Such a denial, though in
patent transgression of the proposed Rule 44 requirements, would not
constitute a per se violation of the due process requirements of the fifth
amendment under the present "fair trial" standard. By analogy to the
denial of a request to retain counsel, such a failure to assign counsel will
at most only render inadmissible any confession or admission obtained
subsequent to the denial. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has indicated
its displeasure with such arbitrary denials of assistance of counsel and the
Court would probably look with extreme disfavor upon any federal conviction in which such a denial occurred.' 8 Strong recognition by the
Court of the importance of assistance of counsel in a criminal prosecution is mirrored in many of its recent decisions,' and its conception of
the right to counsel could be rigorously enforced in any federal appeal by
means of its general supervisory powers over the administration of justice in the federal courts." 0
The requirements of the present Rule 44 are retained as subdivision
105. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 8.
106. A similar duty is imposed on the trial court to protect the indigent's right of
counsel at the trial. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942).
107. "[W]e indulge every reasonable protection against the waiver of fundamental
rights." Glasser v. United States, supra note 106, at 70.
108. See Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) ; Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433 (1958) ; Ex Parte Sullivan, 107 F. Supp. 514 (D. Utah 1957).
109. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Cicenia v. LaGay, supra
note 108; Crooker v. California, supra note 108.
110. See Cicenia v. LaGay, supra note 109, at 508-09; Note, The Supervisory Power
of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1656 (1963).
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(c) of the amended Rule 44. Therefore, a defendant who fails to exercise the right created under subdivision (a) will still be protected if he
elects to go to trial, for the court would then have the duty of advising
him, if he appears without counsel, of the right to have counsel assigned
to represent him. This protection is necessary, not only because an additional warning to the defendant of his right to legal assistance seems
especially desirable just prior to the most critical stage in the proceedings
against him, but also because a defendant could be taken directly into
court without first appearing before a commissioner. 1 1'
IV.

CONCLUSION

More than three decades ago the United States Supreme Court
recognized in Powell v. Alabama that the right of the criminal defendant
to the assistance of counsel was of no significance if it related only to the
time when the accused appears in court and is placed on trial. The defendant, it was said there, "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him.""1 2 But the Supreme Court has not,
in all the years that have passed since Powell was decided, created a right
of early assignment of counsel in all federal defendants through the exercise of its inherent rule making power. This failure is difficult to
comprehend, in one respect, because the Court's adoption of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1944 resulted in the creation of a great
many pretrial rights which are incapable of intelligent exercise by one
unaided by counsel. But even more difficult to comprehend is why the
Court, in the adoption of the Rules, expressly granted the right of early
assistance of counsel only to those defendants who are financially able to
retain counsel of their own choosing. The result of the Federal Rules
has been that some defendants-those with sufficient financial resources
to retain counsel-have been accorded the right to demand an attorney's
assistance almost immediately after arrest, and hence have had legal aid
in nearly every stage of the proceedings against them; in contrast, other
defendants-the indigents-have only been granted counsel's assistance
when they appear before the district court for arraignment, i.e., not until
after arrest, preliminary appearance before a committing magistrate, preliminary examination when demanded, formal charging by indictment or
111. Where the first step is the filing of an indictment or an information, or where
the defendant, under Rule 7, waives prosecution by indictment, there is no right to be
brought before the commissioner. Orfield, Warrant or Summons Upon Indictment or
Information in Federal Criminal Procedure, 23 Mo. L. Rav. 1, 24 (1959).
See also,
United States v. Pickard, 207 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1953); United States v. Maher,
89 F. Supp. 289, 294 (D. Me. 1950).
112. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
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information and after two or three weeks at a minimum have passed since
they were first taken into custody. The Proposed Amendments to Rules
5 and 44 will, if adopted, cure this disparity; they will create in the indigent defendant a right to assignment of counsel at approximately the
same time in the criminal proceedings that the defendant with means can
insist upon the presence of retained counsel.
But let it not be thought that by mere adoption of the proposed
amendments treated above the Supreme Court will assure "equal justice"
to the federal criminally accused. This Note has told only "half the
story," for all that may be concluded at this point is that by allowing an
indigent defendant assigned counsel at an early stage in the prosecution
he may possibly receive "equal justice" in the federal courts. Whether
that goal will be attained depends in the final analysis upon whether the
indigent's counsel, once early assigned, will be able to protect his client's
pre-arraignment rights, successfully assert his pre-arraignment immunities, adequately prepare for trial where a contest of the government's
charge is necessary and collect facts to offer in mitigation of a guilty or
nolo plea. The proposed rule 44(b) provides that district courts must
establish procedures for assignment of counsel by rule of court that they
feel will best suit local conditions and circumstances.' 1 3 Hence, each
federal court must determine for itself how the right to early assignment
created by rule 44(a) can be most effectively implemented-whether by
assignment of private counsel with or without compensation, privately
financed legal aid societies or voluntary defender associations, public
defender, or some combination of these.114 Nevertheless, a major step
113. See note 8 supra.
114. See generally SPECIAL COMMSITTEE TO STUDY DEFENDER SYsTEMs, Ass'N OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED (1959).
There has been a great deal written about the various methods by which counsel
can and should be assigned to assist the indigent criminal defendant. See generally

Celler, Federal Legislative Proposals to Supply Paid Counsel to Indigent Persons Accused of Crime, 45 MINN. L. REV. 697 (1961) ; David, Institutional or Private Counsel:
A Judge's View of the Public Defender System, 45 MINN. L. Rv. 753 (1961) ; Dimock,
The Public Defender: A Step Towards a Police State?, 42 A.B.A.J. 219 (1956) ; Ervin,
Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not Meet the Constitutional Mandate, 49 A.B.A.J.
435 (1963) ; Bell, Criminal Indigent Defense in, the Federal Courts, 37 Los ANGELES B.
BULL. 297 (1962) ; Note, The Representation of the Indigent Criminal Defendant in the
Federal Courts, 76 HAgv. L. REV. 579 (1963). The compensated v. uncompensated counsel argument would become moot should Congress pass the Criminal Justice Act of 1963,
now pending in Congress, for under that proposal all counsel for indigents would be
compensated. But that legislation allows each district court to adopt any of four specified plans of providing counsel: (1) appointment of private counsel to be paid up to
$15 per hour for time reasonably expended, plus reimbursement for expenses reasonably
incurred; (2) establishment of a full or part-time federal public defender office; (3)

appointment of attorneys from the local bar or legal aid societies at the same rate of
compensation as the appointed individual counsel; or (4) a plan of representation providing for a combination of the above three. Hence, the burden of choosing that plan
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will have been taken if the proposed amendments to rules 5 and 44, with
one modification, are adopted by the Supreme Court, for the highest court
in the land will have issued a directive to inferior tribunals to accord
"equal justice" to all the federal criminally accused. Time, the conscience
of judges and attorney's, and perhaps even Congress will determine
whether the ultimate goals envisioned by the drafters of the proposed
amendments will be realized.
which under local circumstances best provide for "equal justice" would still be upon
the district courts.

